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‘The doctrine of vicarious punishment’: space, religion and the Belfast Troubles of 1920 – 22

Niall Cunningham

ABSTRACT

Between 1920 and 1922, the city of Belfast, Northern Ireland was the location of intense violence between Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists arising out of the broader political conflict engulfing the island. Approximately 500 people died within the city as a result of these tensions. There existed marked spatial concentration in patterns of fatality during these original ‘Troubles’ which accompanied the creation of the Northern Ireland state. This paper will present findings from research into this period which makes use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) technology to analyse the spatial distribution and impact of political and sectarian deaths in the early years of the 1920s. It finds that fatalities were heavily concentrated in districts immediately surrounding the city centre and argues that these patterns were profoundly influenced by the nature of the built environment.

KEYWORDS

Ireland; Belfast; Troubles; violence; sectarianism; partition

SHORT TITLE

‘Vicarious Punishment’

The Troubles in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s through to the end of the twentieth century have been the subject of intense academic debate across a range of disciplines in addition to much wider public attention.¹ The ‘original’ Troubles, on the other hand, which accompanied the traumatic period spanning the partition of Ireland after World War I have received comparatively far less attention; indeed, it has been accurately defined as the ‘forgotten conflict’.² Part of the reason for this may lie in the fact that, in contrast to the more recent political conflict in Northern Ireland, the Troubles of the early 1920s were, for all their ferocity, relatively short-lived. Nevertheless, the intensity of the early-1920s should not be underestimated. In 1972, by far the worst year of the recent Troubles, 298 people died in Belfast as a direct result of the crisis.³ However, in the first six months of 1922 alone, 285 fatalities resulted from political and sectarian conflict in the city. This paper will use Geographical Information Systems (GIS) technology to shed new light on the spatial distribution of deaths during the early 1920s and specifically to engage with the pervasive idea in nationalist historiography that the conflict amounted to a ‘pogrom’ against the city’s minority Catholic population.

HISTORICAL AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXTS

The Belfast Troubles of 1920-22 were part of a much larger political conflict engulfing the island of Ireland after World War I. During the course of the late-nineteenth century, the religious divide between Catholics and Protestants had come to embody a much wider political chasm as the vexed issue of Irish Home Rule helped to forge the ideologies of nationalism and unionism.⁴ On the eve of

World War I it finally appeared as if a degree of political autonomy was to be granted to Ireland, the idea of which was anathema to the Protestant population which was heavily concentrated in the northern province of Ulster and which feared that home rule in a Catholic-dominated state would amount to 'Rome Rule'.⁵ In 1912, unionist Protestants signed the Ulster Covenant *en masse*, pledging to defend the northern province of Ireland by whatever means were necessary and began illegally importing arms into the region.⁶ In the south, Irish nationalists organised a parallel 'gun-running' as the seemingly inexorable march towards civil war progressed.⁷ The naming of the 'Ulster' covenant was an explicit recognition of the fact that unionists could not hope to fend off home rule indefinitely across the entire island, in which they were outnumbered by Catholics in a ratio of about 4:1; only in the northern province of Ulster did Protestants represent a majority of the population, and even then it was a modest one.⁸ Yet, despite the irreconcilable political divisions on the island which in turn were inextricably linked to a pronounced religious geography going back to the colonisations of the seventeenth century, prior to World War I few people would have predicted the partition of the island just a few years later.⁹ The outbreak of European hostilities delayed the enactment of home rule for the duration of the war, but events in 1916 destroyed any possibility of a rapprochement between nationalists and unionists. At Easter of that year Irish nationalists took part in an abortive rebellion which was quickly suppressed but the repressive response of the British turned it into a pyrrhic victory and transformed rebel leaders such as James Connolly and Patrick Pearse into republican martyrs.¹⁰ Just three months after the Easter Rising, Protestant Ulstermen died in their thousands at the Battle of the Somme, contrasting the 'loyalty' of their sacrifice with the perceived treachery of the Rising.¹¹ Prior to 1916 reconciliation between the two sides was improbable; after, it was impossible.

By the start of 1920, the War of Independence between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the forces of the British Crown was intensifying.¹² The British Army and civil police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), found it increasingly difficult to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the IRA, deployed

with particular effectiveness in the south-western counties of Cork and Kerry.¹³ In response to this, the British government raised an auxiliary force, composed largely of veterans not long demobilised from the World War I to support the hard-pressed RIC, who became better known as 'Black and Tans' due to the colour of their fatigues.¹⁴ They were widely regarded as ill-disciplined with a reputation for indiscriminate civilian attacks, the most infamous being a retaliatory arson rampage through the centre of Cork in December of 1920 which resulted in extensive destruction of the city centre area.¹⁵

Meanwhile, at a political level, the British had introduced the Government of Ireland Act in the same year, which effectively provided for an independent 26 counties in the south, with an option for the six northern counties to opt-out of the home rule arrangements within a window of one month.¹⁶ These provisions were ignored by southern nationalists of the Sinn Féin party, which had swept the board in elections and refusing to recognise British jurisdiction formed their own parliament, or Dáil.¹⁷ Against the backdrop of escalating violence in Ireland, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George called a summit in London and a party of plenipotentiaries was sent from the new Dáil, which included Sinn Féin leader Arthur Griffiths and the IRA's Director of Intelligence Michael Collins. On 6 December the delegates signed a peace treaty on behalf of British and Irish governments which agreed that the island would be partitioned (at least in the short-term) between a southern Irish Free State and a new Northern Ireland.¹⁸ However, more problematic was the failure of the delegates to secure a full republic; arriving back in Dublin with dominion status within the United Kingdom and the British monarch remaining as titular head of state was seen as an abject failure by republican die-hards like Eamon de Valera and Liam Lynch.¹⁹ The Dáil subsequently split between those opposing and those supporting the new treaty and when it was approved by a narrow margin of 64 votes to 57, de Valera and his supporters withdrew and the Irish Civil War subsequently broke out in June 1922.²⁰ Throughout this period, Collins had continued to support a covert IRA campaign focussed on the new border, but

also sending arms and volunteers to Belfast, partially in defence of the heavily-pressed Catholic nationalist population of the city but also in an attempt to destabilise the nascent state.²¹

While in comparison to the period from 1969, Belfast's Troubles of 1920-22 have been relatively overlooked, the period has featured prominently in histories dealing with Ireland in the revolutionary period as well as those focusing on the emergence of the Northern Ireland state. Most academic energy has focussed on debunking nationalist interpretations of the crisis as a one-dimensional sectarian pogrom against the Catholic population. The starting point for this historiographical debate comes from one of the earliest attempt to quantify the numbers of dead and injured over the course of the three-year period. This was a contemporary account by a young Catholic priest called Fr. Hassan, who published *Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogroms, 1920-22* immediately following the general decline in hostilities in the second half of 1922.²² Hassan's choice of title, and the fact that the book focused solely on the Belfast context, clearly support the notion of a concerted campaign of largely sectarian-motivated violence against the Catholic minority in Belfast. And while Catholics certainly did suffer in numbers disproportionate to their share of the overall population of the city, to describe the events of those years as a 'pogrom' neglects the reality that a great many Protestants were also killed and displaced from their homes during that traumatic time.²³ As the preceding contextual discussion has identified, it would seem that events within Belfast cannot be treated in isolation from those across the rest of Ulster, and indeed, the rest of the island. This is a fact which recurs repeatedly in Alan Parkinson's *Belfast's Unholy War* of 2004 which remains the only monograph dedicated solely to the upheavals of the period 1920 to 1922 in the city.²⁴

There are two other major academic challenges to the pogrom thesis. The first lies in the knowledge that the role of the IRA in Belfast during the conflict which was clearly not just limited to the protection

of vulnerable Catholic enclaves; they also adopted an offensive posture. The work of the historian A.C. Hepburn is considered authoritative on Catholic Belfast in this period and he has written widely on the minority's experience of conflict there.²⁵ In *Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland* he presents the true duality of IRA activity in the city; it was by turns, both defensive and aggressive, and moreover, could not be parsed out from much more explicitly offensive republican activities elsewhere in Northern Ireland, particularly on the new border.²⁶ The historian Patrick Buckland goes somewhat further arguing that the violence of that period can largely be seen as the result of IRA incursions into Northern Ireland and the partial rapprochement between pro-and anti-Treaty forces in the Free State as they desperately sought to deflect attention from the deepening divisions between them over the Anglo-Irish Treaty settlement.²⁷ The most notable example of these republican assaults was the incursion of republican forces into the strategically vulnerable and remote Pettitgo-Belleek salient in the south-west corner of Northern Ireland.²⁸ This argument is convincing, although less so is the assertion that many Catholics who died in Belfast in this period were the victims of indiscriminate IRA 'friendly' fire from within their own enclaves; this may be adequate to explain a small minority of fatalities, but is probably not satisfactory to stand as a general characterisation.²⁹ There therefore seemed to be an interactive relationship between patterns of violence in different places. The work of the historian Peter Hart focused on the activities of the IRA in west Cork, about as far as it possible to travel from Belfast within the island of Ireland.³⁰ However, it is pertinent here as while the spatial propinquity of events in rural Cork and urban Belfast is by no means apparent, the temporal linkages are. Over two consecutive nights in late-April of 1922, ten Protestants were killed in and around the small village of Dunmanway.³¹ Within the previous fortnight, at least thirty people had lost their lives due to the tensions in Belfast, nineteen of whom were Catholic. For Hart, these events cannot be understood in isolation, and the West Cork murders were he suggests, in part, a form of reprisal for the killing of Catholics north of the border.³²

This moves us on to the second argument advanced by historians against the pogrom thesis: the influence of demography. This case was made by Donald Harman Akenson in his 1991 book *Small Differences*, where he states that while the Belfast Troubles of 1920-22 could not be considered a 'pogrom' in the true sense of the word Catholics did come off worse by virtue of the fact that they were the 'weaker of the parties'.³³ This is perhaps a somewhat reductive appraisal of what was actually a much more complex situation. Hart analysed the situation in more detail and has used the city's demography to further erode the pogrom notion, arguing that Catholics, relative to their share of the population, were at least as violent as their Protestant neighbours as they accounted for only 23 percent of the population but may have been responsible for 44 percent of the deaths.³⁴ It would therefore seem that the labelling of entire communities as victims or aggressors is fraught with difficulties in the case of Belfast during the partition era and it will become apparent from the analysis that follows that categorisations of minority and majority status, victim and aggressor, are entirely scale-dependent.³⁵

DATA AND METHODS

The research underlying this paper makes extensive use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) technology in conjunction with traditional archival research. A GIS is commonly thought of as a mapping system, but this is an oversimplification of its potential role and capability in historical research; it can more usefully be thought of as a database technology, in which a wide range of media can be stored, visualised and analysed with reference to their spatial context.³⁶ The application of quantitative methods in history had in the distant past had been scorned, with the Oxford academic Richard Cobb mocking the vision of '...armies of white-coated assistants employed in the clinical historical laboratories'.³⁷ In fact, this was an injustice to the 'social science' approach to history advocated by Charles Tilly, who was really only calling for a proper mixing of methodologies between the quantitative

and the qualitative; the historian's traditional dependency on archival material had effectively served to hamstring the profession by dismissing a potentially important suite of analytical tools, he asserted.³⁸ Yet quantitative tools like GIS have real limitations; the technology is interrogative and it raises as many questions as it seeks to answer. It is excellent at identifying *where* historical phenomena occur but understanding *why* is more problematic. The role of interpreting these patterns cannot be automated, and it is here where the role of primary archive research becomes so important. Archival materials, be they military, political, personal, religious or otherwise are rarely aspatial. They provide specific insights about particular places at a given time in their histories. Historians typically use these to extrapolate a broader picture across time and space, or to put it more beautifully, '...to re-animate dormant memories'.³⁹ It is by meshing these approaches that we can hope to more accurately reflect the heterodox nature of the historical experience across space.⁴⁰

For the purposes of the following analysis the data on Troubles fatalities in Belfast during the period 1920-22 was gleaned from a variety of sources. In the first instance, this was compiled from analysis of Belfast daily newspapers, principally the *Belfast Telegraph* and *Irish News*, but the Dublin-based *Irish Times* and *Freeman's Journal* also provided good coverage, the former having useful summaries of events during the previous seven days in its weekly incarnation as the *Weekly Irish Times*. The *Belfast Telegraph* and *Irish News* were both frequently consulted, particularly with reference to some of the most traumatic events of the period, such as the Weaver St. playground attack, in order to provide a sense of balance in analysing responses to particular occurrences; this is because the *Irish News* has always been aligned with nationalist political opinion and has historically had a predominantly Catholic readership, while the *Belfast Telegraph* has traditionally been seen to represent unionist political interests and has always been favoured by the Protestant population. In addition to these materials, early police reports from the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland were also consulted. Historical scholarship naturally tends to favour primary and contemporaneous documentary evidence over

secondary and other resources. However, in the case of attempting to understand sectarian and/or political deaths in early-twentieth century Belfast, this is not necessarily the best approach to adopt. It is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer for the exact number of casualties of the political conflict in this period based solely on primary evidence, as the information is so often partial, contradictory and indeed, missing. More frequently however, the names of individuals as well as the circumstances and locations in which they were killed were incorrectly recorded, and subsequent reports may provide updated information, but this could often be quite different to the event as originally published. This process made it difficult to be completely certain that the same people were in fact being referred to. This was a particular problem in the most intense periods of conflict, principally during parts of the first six months of 1922. As a contemporaneous account, Hassan's *Belfast Pogroms* is prone to some of the same sorts of error, in addition to conveying a firmly nationalist conception of the events of that time and their causes but it is nonetheless, still a useful resource.⁴¹ However, Alan Parkinson's *Belfast's Unholy War* has been the single most invaluable source of information on fatalities during the early Troubles, providing circumstantial and spatial details as well as how these deaths related to the conflict as whole, not simply within Belfast but also well beyond.⁴²

The majority of deaths tended to be located at individual street or street intersection level. Sometimes details of a specific building or address were provided. In a minority of cases Hassan's *Belfast Pogroms* provided the home address of the individual and other contextual evidence would indicate that the victim died in their own home, often when answering the door, as was the case with William Kerr, a Catholic of 47 Old Lodge Road.⁴³ Another example of the ability to discern extremely specific locations for events was with the death of William Hunter, a Protestant that the *Irish Times* correspondent reported as being killed at the junction of the New Lodge Road and Fountain Street North.⁴⁴

In the case of William Kerr, the ability to link fatalities to particular properties was made possible due to the availability of broadly contemporaneous large scale mapping of the city. Pre-World War II maps of Belfast, while extremely detailed at 25" to the mile (1:2,500), do not provide a vital piece of locational data that post-war revisions reveal. The later series of 25" maps, updated in the 1950s and '60s also included the numbers of individual houses and other buildings at intervals of approximately every 3-4 properties. This meant that it was possible to very accurately locate people to given buildings where such information existed.

The urban landscape of inner-city Belfast changed very little between the early 1920s and the period of the post-WWII map revisions: in no circumstance did a street mentioned in the early 1920s not appear in the later maps. Belfast was indeed to see radical change in the built environment of the inner-city after a long-awaited slum clearance programme finally began to transform much of this area.⁴⁵

However, this process did not start to occur until the mid- to late-1960s and really gained momentum in the 1970s, after these maps were produced.⁴⁶ The final major data source employed in this piece of analysis are the individual census returns from the 1911 enumeration, the nearest currently available record to the Troubles of 1920-22. The National Archives of Ireland (NAI) has recently completed a major programme of digitisation which has made all the original returns freely-available to the public via their website.⁴⁷ Through these remarkable records and the large scale maps it is possible to effectively repopulate the city as it 'existed', at least as recorded through the lens of the census in 1911. The possibilities and practical challenges in such an ambitious goal are considerable, but this article does at least showcase the potential of this material for historical scholarship by piloting a sample repopulation of the Old Lodge, the part of the city which witnessed the greatest number of fatalities at the conflict's height during the first six months of 1922.

THE SPATIAL, STATISTICAL AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT DEATHS IN BELFAST, 1920 –

1922

In total, 491 deaths have been attributed to the conflict in Belfast over the two-year period from 21 July 1920, when the first fatality was recorded, through to 29 June 1922 with the last entry. Of these victims 83 percent were male. It has been possible, according to the records, to assign religions to the victims in just over 95 percent of cases, and of that figure Catholics made up 56 percent while Protestants totalled 39 percent. Of the 491 victims, 30 or 6.1 percent were children of up to and including sixteen years of age. Remarkably, this share of fatalities is extremely close to that recorded for children who died in Belfast over the much longer period of conflict from 1969 to 2001. Of the 1541 political deaths recorded by Malcolm Sutton as having occurred in the city during the later Troubles, 91 or 5.9 percent were of people aged sixteen or under.⁴⁸ In terms of gender ratio however, there is some divergence in trends between the Troubles of 1920-22 and those of 1969-2001. A smaller proportion of the victims in the later Troubles were women with 133 female deaths recorded over the thirty-two-year period from 1969 to 2001, equating to 8.6 percent of the total figure. Yet in just under two years between July 1920 and June 1922, seventy-eight women died in violent incidents directly accruing from the political situation in the city. So, in summary, when we consider Belfast alone as a zone of conflict, the period between 1920 and 1922 represents by far the most intense period of political or sectarian killing in its history.

[\[Figure 1 about here\]](#)

Even within this relatively short period of conflict however, the distribution of deaths was heavily skewed in both spatial and temporal terms. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of fatalities per month. Over the course of the two years, violence tended to be highest in the summer months and was frequently provoked by confrontations surrounding the annual 12 July celebrations in which the Orange

lodges, and Protestants in general, celebrate the victory of William III over the Catholic Stuart King, James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.⁴⁹ The 12 July celebrations have traditionally been associated with increased tension between the two communities in the city and across Northern Ireland more generally and this remains the case up to the present.⁵⁰ However, it was the first six months of 1922 which witnessed an unprecedented increase in the levels of violence in the city, a cycle which began not in the hot, tense days of July but in the altogether chillier month of January, then continuing with increasing ferocity through the first half of the year before tailing off rapidly by the summer.

While the impetus behind conflict in the city between 1920 and 1922 was political, it was in the industrial arena that the initial tensions of July 1920 emerged. Immediately following the return to work of Belfast's Protestant shipyard workers from their annual July 12 holidays, much of the Catholic workforce was expelled from the city's major industrial concerns, such as Harland and Wolff. This followed a mass meeting which denounced the activities of the IRA elsewhere across the island and called for the removal of 'non-loyal' workers from the yards.⁵¹ This came against a background of an escalating conflict in the South, where the deployment of the Black and Tans had served only to harden support for the IRA.⁵² The response of the South's Aireacht or Provisional Government in January of 1921 was the Belfast Boycott, which as Laffan has stated was, '...an understandable reaction to the discrimination and attacks suffered by the nationalist minority in the north-east, but the measure failed to take account of economic realities and was self-destructive in its effects'.⁵³ The violence of the early 1920s not only came against the political break-up of the island, it also occurred against a background of post-war economic decline; even had the Northern unionist administration been more willing, it would have been politically unacceptable to have restored Catholics to their former jobs in a contracting labour market.⁵⁴ The Southern boycott of goods manufactured in Belfast was not only ill-conceived it was also largely ineffectual in anything other than polarising Protestant opinion still further against the South.

Ernest Blythe, a Presbyterian from Lisburn, was a Sinn Féin T.D. for North Monaghan and Minister for

Trade and Commerce in the new Dublin cabinet. He therefore had a broader perspective on Northern Ireland than many of his government colleagues. In August of 1922 he provided a damning and astute analysis of the futility of the policy of economic war the South was attempting to wage against Belfast:

Economic pressure against the North East gives no greater promise of satisfactory results than military action...Nothing that we can do by way of boycott – the economic weapon heretofore in use – will bring the Orange party to reason. A boycott cannot hit the agriculturalists who in the Six Counties as in the Twenty Six, represent the most important economic interest. Their market is not in our territory. No boycott that we can impose can hit the Belfast shipbuilding industry. We control no orders for ships...Our boycott would threaten the Northern ship-building industry no more than a summer shower would threaten Cave Hill.⁵⁵

The Belfast Boycott was proof that while the North and South had become increasingly economically disengaged, politically they had not. Political events across the border were still certain to have profound consequences in the new Northern Ireland. Blythe believed that the perpetuation of policies of guerrilla attacks and hubristic economic warfare could ‘only mean within a couple of years the total extirpation of the Catholic population of the North East’.⁵⁶

[\[Figure 2 about here\]](#)

Blythe was not alone in drawing such a conclusion. In February 1922, as the killings approached their apogee, Bishop Joseph MacRory, whose diocese included Belfast, wrote in an encyclical to his flock of how they were paying the price for the activities of the IRA elsewhere in Northern Ireland in a cycle of violence he referred to as ‘the doctrine of vicarious punishment’.⁵⁷ Some of the key events of this deadly period are illustrated in the timeline in Figure 2. We cannot infer causality solely from the

chronological ordering of massacres during this period, but the central point is that within this six month period the dynamic of inter-communal bloodshed intensified. This was in part due to the activities of the IRA, but it was also a clear product of the highly sectarian nature of the newly-formed civilian police force, the Ulster Reserve Constabulary, which was almost completely Protestant in composition.⁵⁸ Members of this body were responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the entire period, which included a random retaliatory attack on the Catholics of Arnon Street which claimed the lives of five, including that of a man bludgeoned to death in front of his own children, as well as the massacre of the Antrim Road publican Owen McMahon and four other members of his family.⁵⁹ So profoundly divided was the newly-formed polity on religious lines that there was no possibility of the gulf being bridged, even by the most shocking of incidents. This is evident in reaction to the killing of six schoolgirls, when a bomb was thrown into a playground in the small Catholic enclave of Weaver Street, just off York Road in North Belfast.⁶⁰ Churchill described it in a telegram to Collins as ‘...the worst thing to have happened in Ireland in the last three years’.⁶¹ Yet despite the particularly heinous nature of the bombing it did not even merit mention at the next meeting of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, but the site for ‘Stormont egg-laying competition’ evidently did.⁶² Nonetheless, Churchill’s description had incensed the unionist leader Sir Edward Carson, who recorded in his diaries,

Yesterday’s division went very badly for us. Churchill’s speech the day before was abominably clever. It was absolutely wicked of him to speak of the killing of those Belfast R.C. children by a bomb as “the worst thing that has happened in Belfast in 3 years”. There is no evidence whatever, at present, that it was thrown among them on purpose, all we know is that a bomb went among them. But even supposing it was done purposely, it’s a wicked, outrageous crime, it is only one, among how many on the other side?⁶³ [Original emphasis]

While this may have seemed a markedly factional viewpoint, it was one not without some justification. Either the IRA or simply armed Catholics had also been responsible for many appalling attacks on

Protestant civilians, particularly in areas where the latter formed the minority, such as with the attack on the Donnelly family.⁶⁴ The Donnelly's were part of the small Protestant population of the overwhelmingly-Catholic Smithfield ward. They had previously been threatened by nationalists but in March 1922 a bomb was thrown through the fanlight above their front door, killing a two year-old boy instantly and another who died a few days later in hospital.⁶⁵ Or these attacks took place when Protestants were passing through Catholic areas on trams, where, given the highly sectarian nature of most of the city's residential structure, the religion of the passengers could be supposed as Protestant based on the route or destination. Such an indiscriminate bombing claimed the lives of three shipyard workers passing through the Catholic Docks area on 22 November 1921.⁶⁶ Figure 3 shows just how concentrated the area of most intense violence was.

[\[Figure 3 about here\]](#)

Figure 3 uses a GIS technique called kernel density smoothing to map where the intensity of killing was greatest. This is preferable to using individual data points for each victim as it can be unclear from using these points whether the symbol refers to one death or several fatalities occurring in the same location. Kernel density smoothing works by creating a grid from the underlying point layer, giving a value to each cell in the grid which weights more heavily those cells where points are closer together.⁶⁷ The value created measures the number of deaths per square kilometre. Contour lines were then subsequently derived from these grid values which delimit the 50, 75 and 100 deaths per km² ranges respectively. Density smoothing techniques are particularly vital in this context because Figure 3 makes it clear just how concentrated fatalities were in an arc running immediately to the north-west of the city centre. Despite the fact that the distribution of deaths was so concentrated, analysis against local government wards needs to be approached with caution as the epicentre of fatalities crossed a number of

boundaries but was focussed on Court, Dock, Smithfield and St. Anne's. The last of these is particularly problematic due to its peculiar hammerhead shape. St. Anne's ward covered the entire central business district (CBD) of Belfast, but a long south-westerly 'handle' meant that it also extended right out to the city stopline. Pottinger in the east presents similar problems. The ward saw a very high number of deaths during the first period 1920-22, but these were almost without exception located in and around the Catholic enclave of the Short Strand at the extreme west of the ward, an anomalous and highly vulnerable area within the overwhelmingly Protestant religious landscape of east Belfast.

[\[Figure 4 about here\]](#)

Key to this concentration is that fact that both Catholics and Protestants died in virtually the same places, which appeared to act as spatial lightening rods for the wider conflict that was consuming the city. What seemed to set these neighbourhoods apart were two key factors. The first is that the areas in which deaths tended to occur most were those where highly-segregated Catholic and Protestant residential districts came up against one another. The fact of residential propinquity is the critical point here and one we will return to. In relation to the more recent conflict in Northern Ireland such areas have become better known as 'interface' zones.⁶⁸ The clear overlap between Catholic and Protestant patterns of fatality is highlighted in Figure 4 using the same kernel density technique adopted earlier. It should be noted that the area of greatest intensity for Catholics is larger than that for Protestants, and this is logical because, despite being demographically inferior within the city as a whole, making up only about one quarter of the population, they accounted for 56 percent of all victims. This statistic above all else plays to nationalist readings of the conflict which have presented it as a simple pogrom against their community. Certainly, Catholics were undeniably a minority in the city and in addition to their disproportionate contribution to the death toll many more were also forced from their homes, with

about 2000 seeking refuge across the border in the South.⁶⁹ Michael Collins' government sought to publicise through a sophisticated propaganda machine the sufferings being visited upon Northern Catholics by an iniquitous unionist regime.⁷⁰ While a refugee problem was acknowledged by the British government who paid compensation to the Free State administration for the costs incurred in caring for these families, this was a temporary state of affairs with most of the displaced returning to Belfast after a period of weeks or months.⁷¹ This needs to be balanced by the fact that the killing of isolated Protestants in remote areas such as West Cork precipitated a parallel refugee situation, with the difference being that many of the Southern Protestants never returned to their homes.⁷² In turn, this was seized on by leading unionists at the time, but by 1925 there was no further political capital to be gained by either Belfast or Dublin from the miseries of their two displaced minorities.⁷³

[\[Figure 5 about here\]](#)

The second key factor to consider in interpreting these areas of violence is their proximity to the city centre. The remarkable spatio-temporal intensity of the violence in this period is again powerfully reflected in Figure 5. This uses another GIS tool called mean centre analysis to calculate the Euclidian central points for the distributions of deaths in every month of the two-year conflict in which there were ten or more fatalities. During that time the mean centres never ranged more than half a mile in distance at their furthest extent. Furthermore, there is little evidence within the analysis of any progressive gravitational pull in terms of events, just a continued oscillation around the same central districts. In part this can be explained by the role of the city centre as a sort of neutral space, in which the territorial 'ownership' of the CBD by one community or the other could not be claimed in the same way as it could over most of Belfast's residential areas. It was nevertheless a sort of sectarian 'no-man's land' where the battle continued to play out. These metaphors from the Great War are by no means without

relevance. While the conflict of 1920 to 1922 may have been extraordinary even by the troubled standards of Belfast, by the Spring of 1922 violence had become almost formulaic, routine or obligatory, judging by the observations of one journalist in an article entitled, 'The lunch hour hate', clearly echoing the grim banality of trench warfare with Belfast's principal thoroughfare – Royal Avenue, as a sort of Passchendaele and the war-weary troops transformed into the city's everyday workers.⁷⁴

[\[Figure 6 about here\]](#)

It is possible through the use of GIS to gain a much deeper insight into the skewed sectarian demography of the city just prior to World War I. The Old Lodge was an area which has now effectively disappeared as a result of slum clearance and the building of an urban motorway in the 1960s and '70s.⁷⁵ This area was the epicentre of conflict deaths in the first six months of 1922, the most deadly period of the conflict. Figure 6 effectively repopulates the area in a GIS using the individual returns from the nearest available census in 1911.⁷⁶ This shows a district that was typical of most of working-class Belfast at this time: an area of densely-packed Victorian terraces dominated by one particular religious group, in this case, Catholics, who constituted 69 percent of the population. However, in many individual streets the levels of segregation were far higher. Take for example Alton Street, which is in the very centre of the map. This had an enumerated population of approximately 200 people and was 100 percent Catholic. It is only when we understand the extent of micro-scale segregation in the city that we can really appreciate why place could be used to predict the religious persuasion of the prospective, and frequently, random victim. So rather than being an inert zone for historical action, space took on a sort of agency in dictating patterns of inter-communal violence.

[\[Table 1 about here\]](#)

Ward boundaries are rather aggregate measures but they provide some means of assessing the relative risk that minority populations faced from living in particular areas. Table 1 shows the death rates for the two communities across the city's fifteen wards. In general the death rate, and therefore the risk factor, was far greater for Catholics than it was for Protestants across the city, this fact being a combination of a greater fatality rate and a smaller share of the population. Thus the Court ward was actually a far more dangerous place to be a Catholic than the Falls, and this acts as an important corrective to Parkinson's view that the conflict was skewed to the west of the city.⁷⁷ In fact, this was not the case as the spatial evidence has shown that it was heavily concentrated on central and inner-north Belfast and clearly remained there for the duration of the conflict. Mapping provides further potential to explain why this may be the case. Figure 7 shows the infamous Falls-Shankill interface, an area of the city now scarred by a substantial fortified peaceline built in the mid-1970s. Highlighted on Figure 7 are the areas of the interface between the Catholic Falls and the Protestant Shankill that were occupied by industrial premises in the period 1920-22 and it is clear from the map that these mills and factories may have acted to separate the two communities and thus afford each some relative protection. These buildings acted as a buffer because in religious terms, they constituted an indefensible space, unlike most of the city's residential areas.⁷⁸ It is also evident that where deaths did occur between the Falls and Shankill, these tended to be towards the contested and dense residential streets around Cupar Street and Kashmir Road where there was no real physical barrier between the two communities. In the Old Lodge, Short Strand and other areas where the highest levels of killing occurred, the sort of inter-communal firebreaks which large factories offered simply did not exist and working-class Catholic streets ran immediately in to working-class Protestant streets. So the industrial landscape of West Belfast did not prevent violence from occurring, but it did channel it. Consider the following,

The old red and yellow coloured tramcar swayed, whined and groaned over the rails down the Falls Road. There were certain danger points when it passed Cupar Street, Conway Street, Northumberland Street and Dover Street; long streets leading from the Falls to the Shankill. Across these streets at moments of tension the report of rifle fire rang out as snipers on both sides opened up. The tram speeded and clanked past those streets as the driver crouched down on the deck behind the controls. The passengers took their cue and huddled down on the floor which the Tramways department had thoughtfully provided with a carpet of straw. There were audible signs of relief when the neutral Castle Junction hove in sight.⁷⁹

[\[Figure 7 about here\]](#)

Finally, it is important to note that while Catholics in general did face an enhanced level of risk of death during the conflict across wider areas of the city, the group exposed to the highest death rates were actually Protestants living in the overwhelmingly Catholic Smithfield ward, where a ratio of one violent Protestant death per every eighty-three Protestant residents was recorded. This remarkable figure is important for two key reasons. Firstly, it further undermines the notion of a 1920-22 conflict as a straightforward pogrom against one section of the population; if the term is to be used at all it may be more appropriate to speak of it in the plural rather than the singular because what appears to unite both Catholics and Protestants in this period is the fact that both shared a sense of demographic and spatial vulnerability.

LEGACIES

[\[Figure 8 about here\]](#)

How did the trauma of 1920 to 1922 alter the demographic trajectories of the city in the longer term?

Between 1911 and 1926 the population of the city was continuing to grow, albeit at a much reduced rate from the heyday of the late-nineteenth century. However, after 1926 Catholic growth rates began to outstrip those of the city as a whole for the first time in its history, a trend which would intensify throughout the course of the twentieth century and therefore increase the Catholic share of the population.⁸⁰ This is significant for our understanding of the wider causes of the 1920s Troubles, which Lynch has argued stray beyond the explicitly political and into the demographic as the perception of a rising Catholic population was one of the contributory factors leading to the outbreak of violence.⁸¹ This is borne out in contributions to the letters pages of Protestant newspapers immediately prior to the outbreak of violence in July 1920. It is clear from the content and tone of these contributions that they were directly inspired by a particularly virulent speech delivered by Carson just a few days earlier at the annual 'Twelfth' Orange celebrations.⁸² The key element linking the narratives in these letters is the sense of urgency and immediacy, with 'Observer' warning on the 15 July that, 'One should look facts in the face...it seems to me that in a comparatively short number of years the majority of Ulster inhabitants will undoubtedly be Roman Catholics if things go on as at present...It is time that Unionists roused themselves to act, because before very long it will not be possible to do anything'.⁸³ This prompted 'Thor' to reflect on how and why Protestants had allowed such a situation to come about,

We Protestants should ask ourselves how it is that Roman Catholics have made such headway in our midst? I think if we did we should not have any difficulty in finding the answer. We are up against an insidious system of "peaceful penetration" which has to my mind for too long taken

advantage of our fear of being called bigoted...it is time Unionist roused themselves to action and...unless we do so without delay we shall be left helpless and hopeless very shortly.⁸⁴

The great irony of these observations was that while the Catholic population of the city had indeed been growing rapidly, it had not been keeping pace with that of the city as a whole. Consequently, as Figure 8 shows, the Catholic share of the population was in a gradual long-term decline. It was only subsequent to the trauma of the 1920s that their relative demographic fortunes reversed and Catholics gradually grew their share of the city's population. So, while Catholics were actually not increasing relative to the city as a whole there was a perception among Protestants that this was in fact the case.

The baseless fear of Catholic encroachment was intensified by the reality that Catholics were over-represented among the lowest socio-economic echelons of the city's social structure putting them in direct competition with poor Protestants for work and housing, and thus limiting the possibilities for a subordination of sectarian imperatives to a unifying class consciousness.⁸⁵ It was also a possibility that unionist leaders were keen to negate, Carson arguing that the cause of labour was simply another of the 'insidious methods' of Catholics and Sinn Féiners in seeking to create 'disunity amongst our own [Protestant] people'.⁸⁶

[\[Table 2 about here\]](#)

The evidence presented in this paper has served to further undermine the notion that the Belfast Troubles of 1920-22 was a simple pogrom. But perhaps the clearest means of debunking this idea comes not from the reinterpretation of documentary evidence or the uncovering of new material, but rather through assessing the quantitative effect of this violence, for if it was a pogrom, then it was a failed one at most. Deaths are only one metric, albeit perhaps the ultimate measure of hostility which

faces a community; there are many other forms of violence such as expulsion from homes and workplaces which had a profound effect on polarising the people of Belfast in this period. Nevertheless, given the highly segregated nature of the city, the spatial analysis of deaths during the conflict does provide us with a powerful means of linking place, people and political or sectarian dynamics. What the results of correlation analysis in Table 2 show is a highly significant relationship between the deaths of Catholics and the Catholic proportion of the background population. Catholics died, unsurprisingly, in overwhelmingly Catholic areas. However, this statistical relationship strengthened between 1911 and 1926, meaning that such areas became more, not less Catholic over time. In effect, the Catholic population of the city responded to the trauma of that period by hunkering down rather than dispersing.

[\[Figure 9 about here\]](#)

The other lasting legacy of the period 1920 to 1922 has been in how it exacerbated segregation within the city. In this respect the 1920s Troubles were not unique; however, in terms of the scale of the sorting process that the deaths, violence, intimidation and sacking of that period initiated, then those three years were without parallel.⁸⁷ If segregation in Belfast is indeed a 'ratchet' as Boal has asserted, then the period between 1911 and 1926 probably constituted the greatest tightening of that ratchet in the city's history.⁸⁸ This sense of a city sorting its population and polarising further is underlined in Figure 9, which shows that between 1911 and 1926 in only three of the city's fifteen wards did both the Catholic and Protestant populations grow together, despite the fact that the city as a whole still had a growth rate of five percent in this troubled period. Between 1901 and 1911 Catholic and Protestant populations grew in eleven wards and between 1926 and 1937 it was twelve.⁸⁹ The city was continuing

to grow, but it was growing apart. So while the years between 1920 and 1922 were an important milestone, they constituted only one milestone on what has appeared to be a progressive, divergent journey for much of Belfast's history.⁹⁰

CONCLUSIONS


This paper has used GIS approaches to uncover the spatial characteristics of political and sectarian conflict in Belfast in the early 1920s. Mapping of fatality patterns has shown that these were extremely concentrated in specific neighbourhoods to the north and west of the city centre in the Old Lodge, Docks and Smithfield, and on the eastern bank of the River Lagan around the Short Strand. Catholics and Protestants died in the same neighbourhoods, which for demographic, physical and infrastructural reasons acted as the battlegrounds for the wider constitutional conflict. In demographic and physical terms they were highly-segregated areas which were not protected from the highly-segregated areas of the 'other' community through the sort of indefensible residential spaces offered by mills and factories, while at an infrastructural level they also marked gateways into the city centre through which people from outer suburbs had to transit. It is therefore argued that the nature of the built environment had profound implications for the distribution of patterns of violence. Furthermore, by repopulating one of the most violent areas during the conflict with individual-level data from the 1911 census returns, it has been shown how the highly-segregated nature of the city's working class areas facilitated the random targeting of victims based solely on residential location as a proxy for ethno-national or religious identity. These findings have only been made possible through the sort of techniques available through GIS and in this respect it can be argued that it has gone beyond the simple *where* question to address *why* these particular patterns of violence occurred.

Why did inter-communal violence erupt with such appalling ferocity in the city in 1920-22? Horowitz has argued that the causes of ethnic and religious conflict are simply too broad to conceptualise, as, 'A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory'.⁹¹ It is clear that there was a pronounced geography to patterns of fatality in the city, but the inherent problems with the pogrom thesis undermine the notion that deaths were primarily territorial. Toft's theorisation of 'indivisible territory' may have a perfect resonance in the context of other ethnic disputes, such as those in the former Soviet republics of central Asia, but its application to Northern Ireland is more questionable.⁹² Deep as the antagonisms in Ulster were and pronounced as its sectarian geography was, Northern Ireland was never envisaged as a homogenous state. It was always acknowledged that there would be a Catholic minority population; the partition debates showed it was simply a question of managing that minority.⁹³ This is not to say we can completely dismiss attempts to conceptualise ethnic or religious violence. Tilly's attempt to model patterns of conflict in *The Politics of Collective Violence* does have some currency especially in his identification of the power of 'settings-based activation' of antagonism.⁹⁴ He argues that the highly-segregated nature of an individual's social networks continually brought them into situations into which their shared religious identity was salient. These interactions could lead to a 'coordinated destruction' by bringing together people that 'already have a history of conflict' in surrounds where 'shows of group strength already belong to the repertoires attached to those settings'.⁹⁵ In Belfast segregation was not confined to the social realm, it also defined much of the economic life of the city. The original outbreak of violence in July 1920 can be attributed to precisely this sort of setting-based activation as Catholics were expelled from the shipyards but the fact that sectarian modes of congregation were so deeply engrained in the way the city lived, worked, socialised and moved meant that the notion of setting-based activism could be seen to run through almost every quotidian activity, including the daily commute to the factory, shipyard or mill. However, the shipyard expulsions did not arise out of a political vacuum; they were in turn a reaction by Protestants to the

wider crisis engulfing the island and the threat posed by the IRA to the Northern Ireland state itself.⁹⁶ So the disproportionate sufferings of Belfast's Catholics could be seen as a 'vicarious punishment' for the activities of their co-religionists elsewhere. This leads us to the crux of the matter: Belfast in 1920 was effectively a fire triangle in which three remarkably potent elements came together to ignite with fury. The city's underlying demographic tensions arguably provided the fuel, as Belfast had been subject to periodic outbursts of severe inter-communal violence since the mid nineteenth century, while the coming together of an unprecedented political crisis and a severe economic downturn in the aftermath of the First World War supplied the oxygen and heat.⁹⁷ A critic of this conceptualisation of the crisis might argue that in a fire triangle model the conflagration depends on all three elements being in place, and in Belfast the political crisis and the underlying demography were probably enough alone to precipitate what almost amounted at times to an urban civil war. However, this is to underestimate how inseparable economic segregation and stratification were from wider issues of residential polarisation and political difference at the everyday level. It is no accident that the spark that lit the flame came from the shipyards and so much of the carnage that followed resulted from people commuting to and from highly-segregated workplaces and passing through highly-segregated living spaces. At the level of high politics, this criticism also fails to take account of how macro-economic policy was deployed by Dublin as an (albeit desultory) tool of political intervention into the Northern Irish polity. So while Bardon is correct in arguing that what occurred in Belfast during the years 1920-22 did constitute a 'vicious sectarian war' in its execution, its roots really lay in the tumultuous economic and political domains rather than in the city's skewed population base *per se*.⁹⁸ As we have seen, demography provided a source of ongoing tension and dynamism in the city. Yet, despite intermittent outbreaks of vicious inter-communal violence, viewed in a long-term perspective Belfast in 1922 was nevertheless a place of diversity, stability and success. It was a place to which Catholics and Protestants were drawn in huge numbers for the unique economic opportunities it offered on the island and by

1911 had overtaken Dublin as the largest city in Ireland. The overriding lesson from Belfast in the early-1920s is that there is nothing inevitable about ethnic or religious conflict; events in the city and beyond were completely contingent on complex and interrelated dynamics across a number of domains. Whatever of its causes, the awful ferocity of the years 1920-22 would once again usher in another sustained period of 'remarkable calm' that in turn would shape Northern Ireland in the late-twentieth century, and almost certainly for the worse.⁹⁹

Figures



[Figure 1: Deaths per month](#). Source: compiled from contemporary reports in the *Belfast Telegraph*, *Freeman's Journal*, *Irish News*, *Irish Times* and *Weekly Irish Times*. Also: Hassan, *Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom, 1922*; Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War*, 2004.







Figure 2: Deaths per week in 1922 and major events. Source: compiled from contemporary reports in the *Belfast Telegraph*, *Freeman's Journal*, *Irish News*, *Irish Times* and *Weekly Irish Times*. Also: Hassan, *Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom, 1922*; Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War*, 2004.




[Figure 3: Conflict deaths displayed using kernel density smoothing](#)



[Figure 4: Catholic and Protestant conflict deaths displayed using kernel density smoothing](#)




[Figure 5: Monthly mean centres of conflict deaths in all months in which casualties totalled ten or more](#)




[Figure 6: A section of the Old Lodge repopulated according to the 1911 individual census returns](#)

ward	death rate	
	Catholics	Protestants
Clifton	518.68	1330.29
Court	157.51	1064.39
Cromac	5345.00	6140.66
Dock	190.84	398.37
Duncairn	125.14	6183.00
Falls	781.34	484.71
Ormeau	563.83	6097.60
Pottinger	202.41	1751.50
Shankill	301.50	5126.33
Smithfield	513.54	83.07
St. Anne's	235.82	344.94
St. George's	n/a	3401.60
Victoria	265.71	1544.93
Windsor	n/a	n/a
Woodvale	110.57	1016.68

[Table 1: Death rates for Catholics and Protestants in the fifteen wards of Belfast based on 1911 population.](#) Source: *Census of Ireland, 1911.*



[Figure 7: The Falls-Shankill interface and industrial land use](#)




[Figure 8: Inter-censal percentage change in the Catholic and total populations of Belfast; Catholic share of the total population of Belfast between 1871 and 1961.](#) Source: *Census of Ireland, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911* and *Census of Northern Ireland, 1926, 1937, 1951 and 1961*.

		Catholic deaths	Protestant deaths	Catholics 1911 (%)	Catholics 1926 (%)	Protestants 1911 (%)	Protestants 1926 (%)
Catholic deaths	Spearman's ρ	1.000	.691**	.745**	.822**	-.693**	-.641*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.004	.001	.000	.004	.010
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15
Protestant deaths	Spearman's ρ	.691**	1.000	.433	.479	-.349	-.304
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	.	.107	.071	.203	.270
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15
Catholics 1911 (%)	Spearman's ρ	.745**	.433	1.000	.971**	-.739**	-.750**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.107	.	.000	.002	.001
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15
Catholics 1926 (%)	Spearman's ρ	.822**	.479	.971**	1.000	-.764**	-.764**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.071	.000	.	.001	.001
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15
Protestants 1911 (%)	Spearman's ρ	-.693**	-.349	-.739**	-.764**	1.000	.986**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	.203	.002	.001	.	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15
Protestants 1926 (%)	Spearman's ρ	-.641*	-.304	-.750**	-.764**	.986**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.270	.001	.001	.000	.
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

[Table 2: Results of Spearman's Rank correlation of Catholic and Protestant deaths against ward background populations in 1911 and 1926](#)



*Population change rates standardised to ten-year intervals

[Figure 9: Population change between 1901 and 1937 in Belfast's fifteen wards*](#). Source: *Census of Ireland, 1901 and 1911 and Census of Northern Ireland, 1926 and 1937*.

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⁵³ Laffan, *Resurrection of Ireland*, 231.

⁵⁴ Laffan, *Resurrection of Ireland*, 231.

⁵⁵ Policy memorandum on the North-East, 9 Aug. 1922, Ernest Blythe Papers, P24/70, University College Dublin Archives (hereafter UCDA).

⁵⁶ Blythe N.E. policy memo., 9 Aug. 1922, UCDA.

⁵⁷ 1922, Lenten pastorals, MR – VI (JOSEPH CARDINAL MACRORY – PERSONAL)(FOLDERS 1-5), ARCH 11/5/2, Armagh Archdiocesan Archives (hereafter AAA). Hart argues that the West Cork killings were an example of precisely the sort of 'vicarious punishment' MacRory's Lenten pastoral had menacingly foreshadowed not two months previously. See Hart, *I.R.A. and its Enemies*, 277-278.

⁵⁸ Lynch, *The people's protectors?* 386.

⁵⁹ E. Phoenix, *Northern Nationalism: Nationalist Politics, Partition and the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland, 1890 – 1940* Belfast, 1994, 195-204.

⁶⁰ Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War*, 213-215.

⁶¹ Quoted in 'The Belfast pogroms', *Freeman's Journal*, 18 Feb. 1922.

⁶² Topics discussed & conclusions of meeting of 24 Feb. 1922, Cabinet Conclusion Files, Records of Cabinet Secretariat, CAB/4/34, PRONI.

⁶³ Personal Diaries of Sir Edward Carson – 18 Feb. 1922, MIC665/2/Reel 8/D/1633/2/26, PRONI.

⁶⁴ ‘Shooting and bombing’, *Irish Times*, 6 Apr. 1922; Hart, *I.R.A. at War*, 251.

⁶⁵ Parkinson, *Belfast’s Unholy War*, 248.

⁶⁶ Parkinson, *Belfast’s Unholy War*, 171.

⁶⁷ I.N. Gregory, P.S. Ell, *Historical GIS: Technologies, Methodologies and Scholarship*, Cambridge, 2007, 178; D.

O’Sullivan, D.J. Unwin, *Geographical Information Analysis*, Hoboken, NJ, 2003, 85-88.

⁶⁸ A. Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* Chicago, IL, 1991, 36; P. Shirlow, B. Murtagh, *Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City* London, 2006, 16; N. Jarman, Managing disorder: responses to interface violence in North Belfast, in: O. Hargie, D. Dickson (Eds) *Researching the Troubles: Social Science Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict* Edinburgh, 2003, 227-228.

⁶⁹ Minutes of Sir Mark Sturgis (Irish Office), date unknown, probably September 1922, Claims for money on refugees from IFS and NI, Registered Papers, 1920 onwards, Registered Papers 1839-1979, Home Office, HO45/11992, National Archives, London (hereafter NAL).

⁷⁰ Propaganda and Publicity Department Material, 1921-1924, Department of Foreign Affairs, DFA/EARLY1/BOX6/36, TAOIS S1451, National Archives, Dublin (hereafter NAD); Belfast Pogrom, Summary 1920-22, General Files, Department of the Taoiseach, TAOIS S1451, NAD.

⁷¹ Letter from Maxwell (H.O.) to Westerfield (Treasury), 30 Jan. 1925, HO45/11992, NAL; Lynch, The people’s protectors? 377-378.

⁷² ‘Anxious days in the South’, *Irish Times*, 29 Apr. 1922. For evidence of the hardships suffered by those displaced southern Protestants, see the heart-rending testimonies in: Files 1-10, Records of the Irish Distress Committee and Irish Grants Committee: Files & minutes, – Irish Office 1975-1930, Colonial Office 1570-1990, CO762/3, NAL. The intimidation was not limited solely to the Protestant population however; loyalist Catholics were also targeted. See the evidence of James F. O’Donnell in: James F. O’Donnell, County Donegal, No.4, 1925-1929, CO762/3/4, NAL. Equally, ‘rotten Prods’ were also victims of internal policing. See: Daily summary, 14 Oct. 1921, Persecution in Northern Ireland, “Belfast Summary 1921”, Governor General’s Office, DE/2/347, NAD.

⁷³ Letter from James Craig to Winston Churchill, 19 Sep. 1922; Letter from Maxwell to Westerfield, 30 Jan. 1925, HO45/11992, NAL.

⁷⁴ 'Lunch hour "hate"', *Irish Times*, 10 Mar. 1922.

⁷⁵ Building Design Partnership, *Belfast Urban Area Plan 1969 Vol. I* Belfast, 1969, 106-108.

⁷⁶ <http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/>

National Archives of Ireland 1901 & 1911 Census website), accessed 23 Mar. 2012.

⁷⁷ Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War*, 151.

⁷⁸ This is by no means to deny the highly-sectarian character of many industrial workplaces in Belfast at this time; it is merely to argue that these premises did not constitute the same sort of contested defensible space as the city's residential areas.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War*, 181.

⁸⁰ P.A. Compton, The demographic dimension of integration and division in Northern Ireland, in: Boal, Douglas (Eds) *Integration and Division*, 85-86.

⁸¹ Lynch, The people's protectors? 381.

⁸² 'Record Twelfth in Ulster', *Belfast News-Letter*, 13 Jul. 1920.

⁸³ 'Correspondence', *Belfast News-Letter*, 15 Jul. 1920.

⁸⁴ 'Correspondence', *Belfast News-Letter*, 16 Jul. 1920.

⁸⁵ R. Munck, Class conflict and sectarianism in Belfast: from its origins to the 1930s, *Contemporary Crises* 9 (1985), 153.

⁸⁶ 'Record Twelfth in Ulster', *Belfast News-Letter*, 13 Jul. 1920.

⁸⁷ M. Elliott, *The Catholics of Ulster: A History*, London, 2001, 373-379.

⁸⁸ F.W. Boal, Exclusion and inclusion: segregation and deprivation in Belfast, in: S. Musterd, W. Ostendorf (Eds) *Urban Segregation and the Welfare State: Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities*, London, 1998, 100.

⁸⁹ These changes were not the product of changes to the sizes of wards and resultant population transfers during this period. With the exception of Duncairn and Victoria wards, the ward areal units remained stable between 1901 and 1937. In the case of Duncairn and Victoria wards, both wards increased substantially in spatial terms due

to a major programme of land reclamation around Belfast Lough. The drainage of the sloblands created new industrial and port zones in the area of the West Twin in Duncairn ward and also provided the space for a new aerodrome and aircraft factory on the Victoria side of the Lough. For further information see, E. Jones, Land reclamation in Belfast Lough, *Ulster Journal of Archaeology* 21 (1958) 132-141.

⁹⁰ Hepburn, *A Past Apart*, 115-123.

⁹¹ D.L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* Berkeley, CA, 1985, 140.

⁹² M.D. Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence* Princeton, NJ, 2003, 1-2.

⁹³ Laffan, *Partition*.

⁹⁴ C. Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* Cambridge, 2003, 119.

⁹⁵ Tilly, *Collective Violence*, 119.

⁹⁶ Parkinson, *Belfast's Unholy War*, 33.

⁹⁷ Boyd, *Unholy War in Belfast*.

⁹⁸ Bardon, *Ulster*, 494-495.

⁹⁹ Bardon, *Ulster*, 494-495.